


Analysing European Union Decision-Making during the Eurozone Crisis with New Data

Fabio Wasserfallen, Dirk Leuffen, Zdenek Kudrna and Hanno Degner

EMU CHOICES WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018



Analysing European Union Decision-Making during the Eurozone Crisis with New Data

Fabio Wasserfallen, Dirk Leuffen, Zdenek Kudrna, and Hanno Degner

June 2018

Abstract

The collection of articles in this special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of European Union (EU) decision-making during the Eurozone crisis. We investigate national preference formation and interstate bargaining related to major reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The analyses rely on the new 'EMU Positions' dataset. This dataset includes information about the preferences and saliences of all 28 EU member states and key EU institutions, regarding 47 contested issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015. In this introductory article, we first articulate the motivation behind this special issue and outline its collective contribution. We then briefly summarize each article within this collection; the articles analyse agenda setting, preference formation, coalition building, bargaining dynamics, and bargaining success. Finally, we present and discuss the 'EMU Positions' dataset.

Introduction

The Euro is still there. Eight years after the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, “Europe’s economy is finally bouncing back”, as Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared in his 2017 ‘State of the Union Address’.¹ Yet many questions, regarding the stability and the sustainability of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), remain (cf. e.g. Frieden & Walter, 2017; Höpner & Lutter, 2018).

This special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of the politics and policies of EMU reform during the Eurozone crisis. It emerged from intensive collaboration within the context of the Horizon 2020-funded research consortium “N.N”.² All contributions are grounded in a rational-institutionalist theoretical framework, and they rely on a combination of liberal international relations theory and comparative politics approaches (Frieden, 1991; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Rodrik, 1998; Scharpf, 1997). Following the liberal intergovernmentalist ‘baseline model’ of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009), the articles in this special issue systematically cover and link the processes of national preference formation and interstate bargaining to resulting policy outcomes. This entails a systematic application of three analytical key concepts related to political decision-making, namely preferences, saliences, and contested policy issues.

Empirically, the articles in this special issue cover the most important decisions taken (or not) during the Eurozone crisis. Our work comprehensively covers a large sample of policy choices related to EMU, and thereby goes beyond the single-case studies predominant in the field. Methodological pluralism – we combine regression and statistical analyses with tests of formal decision-making models and qualitative case study research – allows us to harvest encompassing insights on the politics of the Eurozone crisis from a high-quality dataset which yields, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive data source to date.

In this introductory article, we first explain the motivation of this special issue and outline its collective contribution to the literature on EMU reforms during the Eurozone crisis,

¹ Online at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm> (accessed 15.01.2018).

² More information on the project consortium can be found at N.N.

and on European Union (EU) decision-making more generally. We then briefly summarize the five individual articles within this collection, which analyse agenda setting, preference formation, coalition building, bargaining dynamics, and bargaining success during the Eurozone crisis. Finally, we present and discuss the new 'EMU Positions' dataset, providing background information on central concepts and the data collection approach (the online appendix provides further details).

Why this Special Issue?

The Eurozone crisis unfolded in early 2010 and lasted, at least, until 2015. After the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in late December 2009, other EU member states, notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, faced interest rate hikes from January 2010 onwards (Lane, 2012). These contagion effects threatened to undermine the stability of the Eurozone and, ultimately, the EU as a whole. Despite all efforts by EU member states and EU institutions to assuage market fears and regain control over the situation (cf. e.g. Dyson, 2017), it was not until 2013 that interest rates for the crisis-ridden countries actually started to decrease significantly. The two major interventions aimed at addressing the crisis were: the extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB), and the EU's fiscal and economic policy reforms adopted by the member states. During 2014, Ireland and Portugal managed to exit their respective fiscal support programmes, while Cyprus and Greece partially regained access to the financial markets. Although the Greek crisis resumed in 2015, after the election of the Syriza government, the acute phase of the Euro crisis ended in 2015, as the risk of contagion in the Eurozone was contained.

The case of the Euro crisis offers a unique opportunity to study all aspects of EU decision-making during a period in modern European integration when stakes were at their highest. The gravity of the situation – articulated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's dictum that "if the Euro fails, Europe fails" – has stimulated enormous scholarly interest in the Eurozone crisis. Between 2010 and 2017, the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) accumulated more than 300 publications with titles including the term 'Euro Crisis' or 'Eurozone Crisis'. Hundreds more investigate the Eurozone crisis without making explicitly titular reference to it – this includes at least fifteen monographs, special issues, or edited volumes from major EU journals or leading publishers, all of which analyse the

causes, consequences, and implications of the crisis from various theoretical and disciplinary perspectives. Some apply mainstream and 'dissident' regional integration theories (Ioannou, Leblond, & Niemann, 2015; Manners & Whitman, 2016; Tosun, Wetzels, & Zapryanova, 2014); others are based on theories of comparative and international political economy (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter, 2016; Howarth & Quaglia, 2016; Schelkle, 2017), or combinations of both (Dinan, Nugent, & Paterson, 2017). Some scholars investigate the political legitimacy and democratic quality of the politics and policies of EMU reform during the crisis (Blauberger, Puntischer Riekmann, & Wydra, 2014; Cramme & Hobolt, 2014), while yet another group analyses the EU's response to the crisis from a comparative politics or governance perspective (Laffan, 2016), applied to different institutionalist foci (Caporaso & Rhodes, 2016; Fabbrini, 2015; Majone, 2014). Given the already-abundant literature on the Eurozone crisis, how can this special issue make a novel contribution? In our view, it can do so by moving beyond the extant literature on EU decision-making, particularly in fiscal and economic policy, in three ways. The first contribution is theoretical; this special issue offers innovative analyses of compelling questions about EMU politics from a rational-institutionalist political science perspective. The broader structure of the special issue mirrors the 'baseline model' of European integration, which dissects the EU policy-making process into a first step of national preference formation and a second step of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993; Schimmelfennig & Moravcsik, 2009). Against the backdrop of this basic model, the five individual articles draw on advances in the general study of EU decision making to develop and assess novel theoretical conjectures about agenda setting, preference formation, coalition building, bargaining dynamics, and bargaining success. While acknowledging that economic factors and the EU's institutional constraints figure heavily into the causes and consequences of the Eurozone crisis, the special issue focuses on the political conflicts during the Eurozone crisis and the resulting outcomes, which led to one of the most important reforms in the history of the EMU.

The second contribution is empirical; the special issue introduces and analyses the new 'EMU Positions' dataset, which includes information on the *observed preferences* of all 28 EU member state governments and six key EU institutions on 47 contested issues related to the most important EMU reform proposals during the Eurozone crisis, as well as the *saliences* the actors attached to these issues. The dataset also includes the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, the

Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, and the Banking Union. Moreover, it covers additional reform proposals on the introduction of Eurobonds, the Financial Transaction Tax or those mentioned in the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ report’.³ So far, these policies have yet to find the necessary support among EU member states for enactment. With few exceptions (cf. e.g. Armingeon & Cranmer, 2018), most analyses of EU decision-making during the Eurozone crisis use qualitative methods, which make stringent comparisons across policy proposals and countries difficult. Moreover, the existing analyses place a strong emphasis on the preferences and bargaining power of selected, highly visible member states (especially Germany, Greece, France, Italy, or Spain). By contrast, our dataset offers the first truly comprehensive overview of national preferences on the most important EMU reform proposals during the Eurozone crisis; this allows the articles in this special issue to go beyond an analytical focus on individual reforms and/or individual countries. Moreover, it allows us to examine the less visible actors as well. Our findings, for instance on the national preferences and saliences of Eastern European countries or those of the Euro outsiders, provide novel insights into important aspects of the politics and policies of the Euro crisis that have not been addressed in existing literature.

Our third contribution is methodological; we build on and extend a research programme that has been highly influential in EU studies. Specifically, to generate the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset, we build upon the systematic approach to data collection first executed in the DEU I and II projects (Thomson et al., 2012; Thomson & Stokman, 2006), with a particular focus on EMU-related issues. By focusing on one issue area, we are able to increase the number of cases linked to one broader topic, and thereby we gain new and better insights into the dynamics of political decision-making in the EU. In particular, we elaborate a better understanding of preference and salience formation at the national level, and a clearer picture of interstate bargaining. A major innovation introduced by our approach to data collection is the combination of extensive document analyses and expert interviews, to define contested issues, policy spaces, and individual member states’ preferences and saliences in an efficient *and* reliable way. We provide in this introductory article and the online appendix detailed documentation of the collection and structure of

³ See <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en> (accessed 15.01.2018).

the data.

In short, the articles of the special issue rigorously analyse preference formation and interstate bargaining outcomes during the Eurozone crisis. Explaining how and why EU policy-makers achieved reforms, but failed to adopt more far-reaching solutions, is a task of significant academic and policy importance. The findings enrich our understanding of EMU politics, EU policy-making, and European integration in general. With this special issue, we make the 'EMU Positions' dataset accessible to the public and the academic community; the dataset is accompanied by extensive documentation, allowing replicability and extensions of our analyses. We hope that many of our colleagues will find our data useful also for the analysis of other topics. Our data can, for instance, be used to pursue the research agendas concerning the dimensionality of EU politics (Bailer, 2011; Mattila, 2004; Selck, 2004; Thomson, 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, & Stokman, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider, & Dobbins, 2005), the influence of specific actors on EU decision-making (Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Costello & Thomson, 2013; Cross, 2013; Golub, 2012; Stokman & Thomson, 2004; Thomson & Hosli, 2006), or the relative strength of theoretical models of legislative bargaining (Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994; Schneider, Finke, & Bailer, 2010; Thomson, 2011; Thomson, Stokman, Achen, & König, 2006).

Summary of the Special Issue

This special issue is designed and structured to systematically link the individual contributions to various overarching research questions. Which reform options were considered as EU policy-makers sought to avoid a collapse of the Eurozone and chart a path towards a more resilient EMU? Why were some reform options selected over others? Figure 1 illustrates the broad universe of theoretically conceivable or potential policy alternatives (i.e. the outer circle), the subset of policy proposals that were officially negotiated in the specific decision-making arenas (which vary across different EMU-related reforms), and finally, the set of reform outcomes that resulted from these negotiations. For instance, a plausible policy to cope with debt crises relieves debtor countries from some of the debts they can no longer service. This can be done either by debt restructuring by creditors (usually banks) or by bail-out by from a federal or similar level. While Greek debts were restructured and a partial bail-out was organized by the EU

and IMF, the policy tools were indirect. Potential policy proposals such as debt relief that reduces principal rather than just postpones payments (see Frieden and Walter 2017 for discussion) or various forms of debt mutualization in the Eurozone (see Eijffinger 2011 for comparison of Eurobond designs) were discussed, but ultimately failed to enter the orbit of formally negotiated policy options. Instead, the EU negotiated other policy tools, like creating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that found more support and were finally implemented. Analytically, this corresponds to a shift in Figure 1, from the set of ‘negotiated policy options’ to the set of ‘reform outcomes’. Most contributions to this special issue focus on the two inner circles of Figure 1; however, individual papers also discuss the narrowing of the potential policy space (e.g. N.N. 2018e, this special issue).




Figure 1: *Reform outcomes and negotiated options as subsets of all potential proposals.*

In addition to the above questions, the special issue investigates the variation among member state preferences on the negotiated proposals. Why are there such important differences between the member states on the core questions of EMU reform? What was the dominant political conflict structure in the reform negotiations? Were certain member states or institutions systematically more successful at achieving their preferred bargaining outcomes? If so, why?

The first empirical article (N.N. 2018b, this special issue) investigates the first step of the baseline model of regional integration theory, namely national preference formation. More specifically, the authors analyse the observed preferences of EU member states on contested EMU issues; relating these issues to European integration as the dependent variable, and a set of domestic economic, political, and institutional factors as explanatory

variables. The empirical results of the hierarchical models suggest that governments are more likely to support further integration in fiscal and economic policy when the exposure of their financial sector is substantial, and when the country is a member of the Euro area. The analyses find less support for the influence of domestic politics, such as party ideology or public opinion vis-à-vis European integration – an important and somewhat astonishing finding, given the high salience and strong public contestation of these issues.

The subsequent four articles move to the second stage of the baseline model, interstate bargaining, with a series of empirical analyses that investigate political conflict, bargaining success, agenda-setting, and decision making models in EMU negotiations.

The second substantive article (N.N. 2018c, this special issue) uses scaling methods to investigate the underlying dimensionality of political conflict that structures the EMU reform negotiations among member states. In contrast to most analyses of EU politics, this analysis finds that the politics of EMU are not multi-dimensional (although they cover a broad range of fiscal, financial, and institutional reform proposals). Rather, they are dominated by a one-dimensional conflict structure – namely, the conflict between southern countries advocating for more fiscal transfers and northern countries prioritising fiscal discipline. On this one-dimensional scale, the article identifies and discusses three broader coalitions. The analysis further suggests that this conflict structure provides a setting conducive to the constant (re-)negotiation of compromises.

The third article (N.N. 2018d, this special issue) maps out and explains the relative bargaining success of member states regarding EMU reforms during the Euro crisis. Using statistical tools for spatial analysis, the authors calculate the distances between member states' positions on 39 of the 47 contested issues in the 'EMU Positions' dataset to the final outcomes. The findings show that, contrary to the conventional narrative of German dominance, the formal negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Moreover, whereas power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist, or close to those of the European Commission, favoured bargaining success; this holds especially when the adoption of policy reform only required the support of a qualified majority, underlining the importance of institutions. The general pattern of bargaining success illustrates dynamics of compromise and reciprocity, where gains and concessions appear to have been traded both within and across issues (this finding is

consistent with the analysis of N.N. 2018c, this special issue).

The fourth article (N.N. 2018d, this special issue) investigates the role of Franco-German cooperation during the Eurozone crisis, conceiving of the 'Franco-German engine' as an inner negotiation core for the whole EU. The article's starting point is the observation that observers disagree about the role of Franco-German cooperation for solving the Eurozone crisis. The authors introduce a number of mechanisms that highlight how France and Germany could jointly affect EMU decision-making. These mechanisms and the causal effect of Franco-German cooperation are tested with process-tracing covering almost all proposals contained in the 'EMU Positions' dataset as well as additional issues that never made it to the formal negotiation table. The article shows that France and Germany had the 'negative power' to eliminate certain proposals; this is to say that France and Germany reduced the set of potential policy proposals open for debate at the EU level. The logic of issue selection and elimination – in line with the logic of the 'second face of power' – can account for an apparently only limited impact of Germany and France identified for instance by N.N. (2018d, this special issue).

The fifth article (N.N. 2018f, this special issue) evaluates the predictive power of competing bargaining models in times of economic crisis. The article provides information about the impact of economic power asymmetries, formal voting rules, and agenda-setting powers for different types of decisions during the Eurozone crisis. Moreover, the article specifically investigates whether the dynamics of negotiations during the Euro crisis were similar to the dynamics of ordinary legislative negotiations or whether the high saliency of some of the negotiation lent a distinctive importance to domestic actors, such as national parliaments. The empirical findings show that, in this case, assigning a different weight to domestic actors would improve the predictive power of asymmetrical Nash bargaining models depending on, amongst other things, the type of issues and the formal voting requirements.

Finally, the article by N.N. (2018g, this special issue) concludes the special issue by critically evaluating its main findings, contributions, and limitations. In addition, it provides further insights on the analysis of EMU politics, places the contributions of the special issue into the context of the broader literature, and discusses future avenues for research.

Taken together, the contributions to this special issue offer an analytically rigorous and

empirically informative account of EU decision-making during the Eurozone crisis. In particular, due to the analysis of the 'EMU Positions' dataset, we now know a lot more about national preference formation on EMU reforms and about the dynamics and mechanisms of interstate bargaining in regard to the future design of the "flagship project of European integration" (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 271). As to national preferences, the special issue informs us that, in a crisis that threatened EMU survival, macroeconomic reasoning was dominant as opposed to genuine political factors, such as public opinion or institutions. Linked to this, three further observations are noteworthy. First, the positioning of countries varied greatly, not only according to their embeddedness in different political economic models (cf. Hall, 2012) and the international exposure of their banks, but also according to whether a country is part of the Eurozone or not. Second, while member states' preferences substantively differed at the outset of the negotiations, and bargaining was tough (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2015), all member states were ready to accept solutions which, at least in parts, were quite distant from their initial ideal points.

The articles relating to the outcomes of EMU crisis negotiations show that, despite the high salience of issues, even the most powerful EU member states, Germany and France, needed to, but also were willing to, agree on package deals or compromise solutions. Although a number of potential policy proposals were dropped from the menu of choices right from the start of the negotiations, not least because of the resistance of the powerful member states, overall compromise and compensation prevailed over the elimination logic sketched out by Tsebelis and Hahn (2014). Widespread public dissensus on either fiscal solidarity or fiscal austerity did not 'constrain' (Hooghe & Marks, 2009) member state governments to significantly deepen the EMU (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2014). Third, the analyses of the 'EMU Positions' data empirically supports the presence of strong and stable 'camps' of member states, more or less reflecting the geographical patterns of North versus South. The role of Eastern European member states is interesting. Our analyses suggest that many held moderate positions in the centre, while they were overall tilted towards the coalition supporting austerity-related measures.

More generally, the special issue highlights that our understanding of EU politics can be improved substantially by focusing on individual policy areas. For instance, past research on preference formation has always suffered either from a too-narrow approach on individual policies or a too-broad account that makes it difficult to explain preferences. Shifting attention to the meso-level of one policy area, with an enlarged number of cases,

allows for a more rigorous and substantively promising assessment of different theories of preference formation. The same holds for analysing the mechanisms of interstate bargaining, given the natural links among the contested issues identified in our dataset and also that the decision-makers negotiating the reforms were in constant contact, allowing for reciprocity and compensation.

The findings of the special issue emerge as a mixed picture, when it comes to formulating predictions on the reform capacity and future development of the EMU. The analysis of decision-making during the Eurozone crisis leads us to be sceptical of the emergence of major EMU reforms in the next years. Member state governments are still mostly anchored in their domestic economic contexts, and we have little reason to expect significant progress with regard to macro-economic convergence in the Eurozone in the intermediate term (Sinn, 2014). At the same time, with the historical decision to bind their fates in the EMU, the actors' choice set is restricted; the enormous pressure to preserve the Euro through commonly supported policy reforms will continue to persist.

The EMU Positions Dataset: Concepts, Data Collection, and Summary of the Data

All five empirical contributions to this special issue use the 'EMU Positions' dataset. This dataset builds on a spatial model of politics and codes the positions and saliences of all 28 EU member states and key EU institutions, with respect to the most important reform proposals negotiated during the Eurozone crisis. Before introducing the dataset and our data collection approach, we specify the concepts central to our approach. These include 'observed preferences', 'saliences', and 'contested issues'.

Observed Preferences and Saliences

The 'EMU Positions' dataset records data on preferences and saliences of EU member states and a number of EU institutions with regard to selected EMU issues. According to the definition of Frieden (1999, p. 42), "an actor's preferences are the way it orders the possible outcomes of an interaction". We refer to the concept of *observed preferences* (Frieden 1999, p. 57) as the empirical ordering of a given choice set, whereas the ranking of the policy options reflects the 'true' preferences, or ideal points, of an actor (which are

not directly observable).⁴ This approach is standard in the study of EU politics. Alternative strategies to the empirical coding of *observed* preferences rely either on *assuming* them, like the Downsian type of vote maximization, or *deducing* preferences from theories of preference formation (cf. Frieden, 1999). Neither alternative can be used for the empirical analysis of theoretical arguments, as both derive preferences without empirical grounding.

Another strategy of preference measurement consists in deducing preferences from observed behaviour for instance through inspections of voting behaviour in legislative assemblies such as the European Parliament or in the Council (cf. Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007; Mattila, 2009; Poole, 2005). In our case, this strategy would suffer from some important shortcomings. Given that most EMU reform proposals are decided by unanimity, we could detect no variance of positions and would confound the acceptance of a negotiation output with the initial preferences brought to the negotiation table. Most importantly, because we are interested in quite a limited number of well specified issues, we can afford to follow a higher resolution approach to preference measurement. Therefore, for our purpose, a comparative source-based strategy commonly associated with the case-oriented approaches used by historians, journalists or in court assures the highest possible degree of validity and reliability. We provide more details on our measurement strategy below.⁶

The key assumption of the concept of *observed* preferences is that the ordered choice set reflects the ‘true’ underlying preferences. This is of importance because representatives of a country may advocate a ranking of positions that deviates from their ‘true’ underlying preferences, when they send specific signals to domestic constituencies or seek to strategically influence the behaviour of other countries (Frieden, 1999; Putnam, 1988). Morrow (1999) analyses such strategic behaviour in international politics and shows that

⁴ Frieden (1999: 57) uses „observed“ and „revealed“ preferences as synonyms.

⁶ For the empirical coding of preferences in EU studies, the most commonly used measurement tools are historical reviews of primary and secondary sources (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998, Wasserfallen 2014), expert interviews (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994; Thomson et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2006; Thurner et al., 2002), hand-coded content analyses of European party manifestos (e.g. Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Veen, 2011), computerized quantitative text analyses (e.g. Benoit et al., 2005; Klüver, 2013), analyses of voting behaviour (e.g. Mattila, 2009) and expert surveys (e.g. Armingeon & Cranmer, 2018; Benoit & Laver, 2006).

weakly institutionalized settings and high uncertainty about the ‘true’ preferences of negotiation counterparts are conducive to strategic position taking. He also argues that this kind of negotiation settings is prevalent in international security politics.

The politics of the EMU, however, stand in stark contrast to this negotiation environment. EMU negotiations are embedded in an exceptionally information-rich environment and a highly institutionalized structure of policy making. All participants in EMU negotiations can rely on abundant and shared information on the discussed policy options and the positions of others (see also Moravcsik, 1998). Representatives of EU member states meet on a monthly basis to negotiate economic and fiscal policies. Moreover, the most recent rounds of EMU negotiations are extensions of discussions that have been intensively debated since the EMU was established in 1991.

In this information-rich and highly institutionalized environment of frequently repeated negotiations on the same topics, member states can hardly achieve negotiation successes by misrepresenting their ‘true’ preferences. Based on this, the EMU negotiation environment allows for the empirical coding of rankings of positions as reasonable approximations of the ‘true’ underlying preferences of member states.⁷ A note on the terminology may be useful at this point, as some scholars use ‘positions’ or other related concepts as synonyms for preferences (cf. Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 16; Bueno de Mesquita, 2004, p. 130). This is also appropriate in our case because, following the above discussion on *observed* preferences, the preference data of the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset is equivalent to *sincere positions*.

Salience is the second core concept of political analysis integrated into many theoretical decision-making models (Achen, 2006, p. 92; Golub, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010). It features prominently in models of vote choice, public opinion research, interest group politics, and formal and informal models of legislative decision-making (Leuffen, Malang, & Wörle, 2014, p. 617ff). We follow the DEU project’s articulation of the concept by using the term synonymously with “importance” or “intensity” (cf. Thomson et al., 2012, p. 612). More specifically, we build on the understanding of salience developed by Thomson and

⁷ Please note that our analytical argument is not that negotiations positions are fully exogenous to the negotiation environment. Rather, for the validity of the concept of observed preferences, a more modest assumption is sufficient, namely that the rankings of the policy options are not distorted by systematic dishonest signals that are reflections of strategic considerations.

Stokman (Thomson & Stokman, 2006, p. 41ff) as “the extent to which actors experience utility loss from the occurrence of decision outcomes that differ from the decision outcomes they most favour”.

Contested Issues

We coded policy proposals that made it to the formal negotiation stage during the Eurozone crisis (and also include a number of forward-looking proposals, which were part of the Five Presidents’ Report). For the coded policy proposals, we use the term ‘contested issues’ because all coded issues were politically controversial and offered a choice set for member states.

A unique feature of the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset is that it is both very detailed and comprehensive. First, the dataset codes all contested issues on EMU reforms from 2010 to 2015, with few non-issues blocked by the agenda setting, including proposals for secondary legislation, intergovernmental treaties, and international agreements. Second, the dataset provides data on a distinct policy area, which makes preferences and saliences on the contested issues more comparable. Third, the whole range of contested issues includes a very broad set of proposals on fiscal measures, financial support, banking regulation, and institutional reform. Finally, the data covers high stakes negotiations (while the DEU dataset, for example, is limited to secondary legislation, covering a larger set of policy areas, but also proposals with relatively low stakes).

Like other projects on EU decision-making, we do not provide data on potential proposals that were supported by some actors but failed to attain the formal decision-taking stage (see Figure 1 on this distinction). The work by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) on the two faces of power and ‘non-decisions’ raises the question of why some proposals (and not others) pass the agenda-setting phase. The study of agenda control, bureaucratic power, and gatekeeping has to rely on additional empirical material beyond our dataset. In this special issue, for example, the analysis of the German–French tandem (N.N. 2018d, this special issue) builds on additional empirical material, precisely because an important power of France and Germany is their dominant role in defining the choice set available in European negotiations.

Data Collection in Five Steps

Our approach to data collection follows established practices, first introduced in Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994), and further developed by the Decision-Making in the European Union (DEU) I and II datasets (Thomson et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2006). The DEU data collection had a major impact in the field of EU studies (cf. Mattila, 2012, p. 452f) and “in many ways presents the best that scholarship on EU decision-making currently has to offer” (Princen, 2012, p. 624). Based on our previous experience with this data collection, and with regard to the strong media coverage of the politics of EMU reform, we decided to include an additional step into our data collection by analysing about 5000 secondary and primary sources *before* conducting expert interviews. The document analysis provided our interviewers with a solid understanding of the contested policy issues, and contributed to improving the overall quality of our interviews. Moreover, extending the number and types of sources allowed us to more systematically triangulate our data and to gauge the uncertainty of our measures.⁸

Our data collection process consisted of five steps (see the online appendix for more details). First, we aimed to identify and select the most important policy proposals officially negotiated during the Eurozone crisis. Unlike the DEU project, which gathered secondary legislation proposals from diverse policy areas, we focused on the most contentious debates regarding the field of economic and fiscal policy between 2010 and 2015. To arrive at a comprehensive dataset, we also included proposals for primary law changes (treaty changes or new intergovernmental treaties discussed in the European Council) under negotiation during the Euro crisis, as well as strategic policy papers by EU institutions that outlined potential future reforms. On the basis of an extensive analysis of official EU documents, quality news media articles issued, for instance, by *Euractiv*, as well as European Council conclusions and *EurLex* documentation, we identified and selected the following ten proposals: 1) The initial proposal to support Greece, 2) the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 3) the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 4) the Six-Pack on fiscal and economic governance, 5) the Two-Pack on the coordination of national budgets, 6) the Fiscal Compact, 7) the Banking Union, 8) the Financial Transaction Tax, 9) Eurobonds, and 10) the Five Presidents’ Report (see Table 1 below).

⁸ As the interviews largely corroborated our preliminary coding, we were able to limit our validation interviews to 29, greatly reducing the costs of data collection.

Second, we aimed to identify and select the most contested policy issues within these ten proposals. So far, three different approaches have been used in the literature for such purposes: some scholars select *all* issues from a (set of) proposal(s), e.g. by treating all clauses of a legislative proposal or an intergovernmental treaty draft as contested issues (see e.g. Thurner et al., 2002, p. 26); others select *a limited number* of issues from a proposal by applying certain selection criteria to the full population of issues (see e.g. König & Hug, 2006); and still others confer the task of contested issue selection upon external experts, notably political decision-makers or administrative staff working at national ministries, member states' permanent representations, or EU institutions (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994; Thomson et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2006).

We integrated the latter two mechanisms by, first, identifying and selecting a range of contested issues from the ten proposals by qualitatively analysing a corpus of 831 *Euractiv* articles⁹ and, subsequently, by validating and completing this selection through expert interviews with senior officials from EU and national institutions. The finally selected 47 contested issues (see Table 1) meet the following four criteria: (i) they cover policy conflicts related to one of the ten selected reform proposals; (ii) they are identifiable in the available primary and secondary sources, which excludes contested issues that were neither discussed during formal negotiations nor remarked upon publicly; (iii) they can be reduced to a one-dimensional policy space (see the codebook in the online appendix); and (iv) they were validated by experts who actually participated in the respective policy negotiations.

Importantly, the users of our dataset will ultimately decide upon whether they want to include all these issues in their analyses, or just a subset of issues or proposals. Case selection should vary for different research questions or depending on theoretical considerations; for example, N.N. (2018f, this special issue) expects the predictive quality of decision-making models to vary with respect to different decision-making rules.

⁹ *Euractiv* generates consistent, in-depth text written in a standardized style and language (English), which makes the reporting across reforms comparable. Unlike alternative sources, such as *Agence Europe* or the *Financial Times*, *Euractiv* is an open-access source, and its reporting pays particular attention to smaller member states.

Third, we coded the preferences of all 28 EU member states and six EU institutions¹⁰ for all 47 issues, as well as the saliences the actors attached to these issues. Following the DEU-blueprint, we used scores between 0 and 100 to code the two most extreme positions within the one-dimensional policy space. Like Thomson (2011: 26) we were interested in controversies related to specific legislative proposals and did not aim at measuring more latent or abstract concepts, in contrast, for instance, to Benoit and Laver (2006), McElroy and Benoit (2007) or Lowe et al. (2011). A substantive part of the issues turned out to be binary choices (see Table 2 in the next section). For all other issues, we explicitly defined any in-between positions and assigned scores that broadly reflect the closeness to either extreme position (see Figure 2 for an example). The policy space thus is defined by expert judgements, both inside our research consortium (we systematically and repeatedly compared the scoring of different team members) and by our expert interview partners. Convergence on the understanding of the policy space was generally reached and we therefore believe that the distances between positions are meaningful. However, we would like to emphasise that the users of our dataset are free to use the data as measured at an interval or an ordinal level (or both as robustness checks). Also the articles of this special issue apply a variety of empirical approaches, including ordinal and linear models.

As to the comparability of scales across different issues, we agree with Thomson et al. (2012: 615) that this again depends on the research interests of the dataset's users. It may be legitimate to consider the entire set of issues when interested in establishing general distances between EU or EMU member states. For other substantive interests, however, it might be recommendable to focus on just a subset of our data. N.N. (2018b, this special issue), for example, only include those issues into the analysis that could be linked to an underlying integration dimension. In our codebook we provide detailed descriptive information on our data in order to enable researchers to take informed choices when designing their empirical research.

Table 1: EMU reform proposals and contested issues of the EMU Positions dataset

¹⁰ Besides the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Central Bank, the dataset also covers the European Council, the ECOFIN Council, and the Eurogroup. Note that the two articles on bargaining success (N.N. 2018d, this special issue) and bargaining models (N.N.2018f, this special issue) in this special issue do not include all of them in their analyses.

Reform Proposals		Contested Issues	
1	Assistance to Greece	1	G1 Initial willingness to support Greece (Bailout I)
		2	G2 First Greek programme: ad hoc or systematic
		3	G3 IMF involvement in the First Greek programme
		4	G4 Debt relief in the Second Greek programme
2	EFSF	5	EFSF1 Preparedness to issue loan guarantees
		6	EFSF2 IMF involvement
		7	EFSF3 Enhancement of the EFSF's effective capacity
		8	EFSF4 Allowing the EFSF to use additional instruments
3	ESM	9	ESM1 Changing of EU treaties
		10	ESM2 Size of the ESM
		11	ESM3 Conditionality
		12	ESM4 Private sector involvement
		13	ESM5 Support instruments of the ESM/EFSF
		14	ESM6 Financing of the ESM
		15	ESM7 Role of supranational institutions in the ESM
4	Six-Pack	16	SP1 Suspension of Council voting rights for non-compliant member states
		17	SP2 Withholding EU Funds to deficit countries
		18	SP3 Blocking of SGP sanctions by reversed qualified majority
		19	SP4 Six-Pack rules on "good" and "bad" debts
		20	SP5 Asymmetry of macroeconomic imbalances
5	Two-Pack	21	TP1 Redemption fund in Two-Pack
		22	TP2 Pre-approving of budgets by the Commission
		23	TP3 Independent macroeconomic forecasts
6	Fiscal Compact	24	FC1 Adoption of the Fiscal compact
		25	FC2 Adoption by Treaty change
		26	FC3 Legal form of the debt brake
		27	FC4 Role of the ECJ in the Fiscal compact
		28	FC5 Role of the COM in the Fiscal compact
		29	FC6 Participation of non-Eurozone members at Euro Summit
		30	FC7 Purpose of the Fiscal compact
		31	FC8 Tax policy coordination
		32	FC9 Incorporation to EU Treaties
		7	Banking Union
34	BU2 Capital buffers: centralisation or flexibility		
35	BU3 Scope of the SSM: all banks or some banks		
36	BU4 Double majority for decisions of the European Banking Authority		
37	BU5 Institutional responsibility for SSM at ECB		
38	BU6 SSM deadlines: speed or quality		
39	BU7 SRM: decision-making powers		
40	BU8 SRF build-up and mutualisation		
41	BU9 SRF fiscal backstop		
8	FTT	42	FTT Support for Financial transaction tax
9	Eurobonds	43	EB1 Support for mutualisation of Eurozone debt (Eurobonds)
10	Five Presidents' Report	44	PR1 Short-term ambitions for a fiscal union
		45	PR2 Potential redistribution within a fiscal union
		46	PR3 Political accountability
		47	PR4 Social policy integration

Source: own depiction. See online appendix for comprehensive definitions of issues.

Figure 2 presents an example of a policy space with four substantive positions regarding

the question of whether the EU treaties should be changed for the introduction of the ESM. Most member states held position 20 and thus preferred a limited treaty change through the introduction of Art. 136.3. This change only authorized the creation of the ESM, but neither enhanced the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Position 60), nor fundamentally transformed the governance of fiscal and economic policy in the EU by transferring additional competencies to the supranational institutions (Position 100). Although neither Germany, nor the ECB, nor France held this position, it emerged as the outcome of the interstate negotiations.




Figure 2: Example of a policy space of a contested issue.

For saliences, we used a scale ranging from 0 to 10 with 0 reflecting no interest whatsoever and 10 the highest possible interest in an issue. We have coded saliences as an interval scale, believing that average values can provide meaningful insights. But again, we have no principal objection against treating our salience data as ordinal.

With regard to timing, we coded preferences and saliences after the specific proposal was put forward, but before the final consensus was reached in the Council or the European Council. If an outcome was reached by the end of 2015, it is also reported in our dataset. Our data collection procedure guarantees strong replicability standards, in accordance with the ‘data access and research transparency’ (DA-RT) initiative (cf. Lupia & Elman, 2014). In particular, each coded position contains a link to those document(s) and

statement(s) that revealed the positions of the member state. Thus, we allow researchers to gauge the uncertainty of our measurements, mirroring the advances made in measuring party positions through expert surveys (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006). In addition, we have set up an internal review process, whereby each team in our consortium critically reviewed the issue definitions, policy spaces, and position coding of other teams before conducting expert interviews. This review process enabled us to streamline definitions and sharpen interpretations, and it ensured the consistency of coding across the dataset.

Fourth, our interviews validated the selection of contested issues and definitions of policy spaces and contributed to reaching a satisfactory level of completeness in our data collection. Since the document analysis provided a solid foundation for efficient interviews, we were able to validate positions quickly and increase their completeness from 54% to 73%.¹¹ In addition, we asked the interviewees for their assessment of the saliences that member states' governments attached to the contested issue, because such salience scores proved hard to code through document analysis. The final completeness of the salience scores dataset reached 60%. Overall, we conducted interviews with 29 senior officials from 10 EU member states; each official had been personally involved in the relevant decision-making process.¹² The document analysis and validation interviews complement each other in a Bayesian updating logic (Humphreys & Jacobs, 2015), while maintaining the best practices in the field of measuring preferences and saliences (see also Bailer, 2011, p. 464; cf. Thomson, 2011, p. 36ff; Warntjen, 2012).

Finally, we triangulated and aggregated the data following three different aggregation procedures (winner-takes-all, weighted-average, decision-tree method) (cf. Leuffen et al. 2012). These procedures utilized, in different ways, information on (i) the credibility of

¹¹ This validation approach created some risk of confirmation bias on the part of the interviewee. However, pilot studies indicated that experts were keen to point out various complexities of the negotiation process that could not be included in the simple definitions of the policy issues. Furthermore, to reduce the risk of a confirmation bias, we adopted a wording of the questionnaire emphasizing that the data stem from media reporting (taking ourselves at a distant and neutral position).

¹² They included state secretaries for EU affairs and senior civil servants working for member states or the EU (in the Council secretariat, Commission, European Parliament, European Central Bank, the Eurogroup working group, relevant national ministries, national central banks, or permanent representations).

sources, (ii) the quality of the interview, and (iii) the consistency scores for the coded preferences (see online appendix for details).¹³ The simplest aggregation method is the winner-takes-all approach adopted by the DEU project (Thomson et al., 2012). Using our credibility, quality, and consistency indicators for each data point, we selected the highest-quality coding, following a winner-takes-all selection procedure. The downside of this method is that it does not use all available data. The second aggregation relies on weighted means (cf. Leuffen, Shikano, & Walter, 2013), attained by using the rating of the interview quality to weight inconsistent position scores. While weighted means use all available data, the resulting scores demand further interpretation, as they are not necessarily specified in the definition of relevant policy space. Finally, the third method is based on the decision-tree procedure, which selects the majority view among position scores. In case of a tie, it prioritizes the document analysis. The decision-tree procedure thus selects the most credible coding, and has the advantage of keeping aggregated positions in line with the positions defined within the policy space. When comparing the results of the different aggregation strategies, we find in 92% that these different methods did not lead to different positions; this highlights the strong agreement of our sources and our data's reliability. All papers in this special issue use the version of the 'EMU position' dataset, which relies on the decision-tree aggregation strategy.

Summary of the 'EMU Positions' Dataset

Table 2 summarizes a number of key aspects of the 'EMU Positions' dataset. It lists the number of positions in the policy space (29 contested issues are coded as binary, 17 include three pre-defined policy positions, and one includes four positions). In addition, the column on the coded positions reports the broad coverage of our dataset. For 28 contested issues, we have coded the positions of more than 20 member states, while the average coverage across all 47 issues is 20.5 member states. The use of multiple sources,

¹³ The credibility of the document source was coded 'A' for official documents from national or EU institutions (25% of sources), 'B' for reliable media, such as Euractiv, Financial Times, Reuters, Agence Europe or published scholarly articles (65%), and 'C' for less established media sources (10%). The quality of interview was judged by the interviewers from our consortium on a five-point Likert scale in comparison of all interviews done in the given member state. Finally, to gauge the consistency of input scores from the document analysis and the expert interviews, we adopted a rating on a scale from 1 to 5 (see table below), whereby 4 and 5 indicate dissenting position scores.

combined with the triangulation strategy, maximized the completeness of the data. The coverage is lower for EU institutions, which do not regularly articulate a consolidated position. The average coverage is 3.3 (out of 6) EU institutions.

Table 2 also lists the average position scores, showing a fairly even distribution among contested issues that have an average position in the middle, those that are tilted more in favour of one side as well as issues where nearly all member states shared the same position (resulting in average scores close to 0 or 100). The EU institutions more often converge on the same positions (usually coded as 100).

In addition, Table 2 reports the outcome. The comparison of the distances between the final outcome and the average positions of EU member states and institutions, which we can calculate for 40 contested issues, shows that in 21 issues the average of member states' positions was closer to the final outcome, while in 17 cases the average positions of EU institutions were closer (in 2 issues the average was the same). This indicates that the reform of the EMU was a mixture of intergovernmental bargaining and decision-making with the involvement of EU institutions. Finally, the last column reports the average saliency score for member states. Interestingly, the average salience is rather low for the contested issue of the Greek assistance programs and the EFSF, while we found the highest salience scores for the issues of the Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact.

Table 2: Summary of the EMU positions dataset

Contested Issues	Positions in the policy space	Coded positions		Average positions		Outcome	Average salience
		MS	EU institutions	MS	EU institutions		MS
1 G1	2	27	4	70	100	100	5.1
2 G2	2	8	5	38	60	0	4.2
3 G3	3	23	6	57	25	100	5.8
4 G4	3	21	5	45	30	50	5.2
5 EFSF1	2	21	6	81	100	100	4.1
6 EFSF2	3	15	6	53	0	100	3.6
7 EFSF3	2	18	5	72	100	100	4.6
8 EFSF4	2	11	3	64	100	100	4
9 ESM1	4	28	4	19	60	20	6.1
10 ESM2	2	21	3	95	100	0	8.2
11 ESM3	2	7	3	100	100	100	na
12 ESM4	3	17	4	45	15	20	6.5
13 ESM5	3	17	3	47	100	20	6.9
14 ESM6	3	18	4	68	35	0	7.8
15 ESM7	4	19	3	31	100	40	6.2
16 SPA1	2	22	3	41	67	0	8
17 SPA2	2	27	3	44	33	0	8.3
18 SPA3	2	23	5	74	60	100	9.7
19 SPA4	2	23	3	35	100	100	5
20 SPA5	2	10	3	50	33	0	7.8
21 TPA1	2	20	5	55	60	0	7.8
22 TPA2	2	28	3	4	67	0	9.8
23 TPA3	2	28	3	4	67	0	8.3
24 FC1	3	28	0	88	na	50	7
25 FC2	3	21	4	86	75	0	8.8
26 FC3	3	26	3	35	83	50	9.5
27 FC4	2	28	2	4	50	0	9
28 FC5	2	19	2	47	50	0	9
29 FC6	3	11	2	68	25	50	9.2
30 FC7	3	12	3	33	50	0	6.1
31 FC8	2	22	1	59	100	0	7.7
32 FC9	2	8	3	100	100	100	9.3
33 BU1	2	17	4	94	100	100	5.3
34 BU2	3	21	3	14	67	50	5.4
35 BU3	3	23	3	77	100	70	5
36 BU4	2	23	1	9	0	0	5.5
37 BU5	2	12	2	33	100	100	3.2
38 BU6	3	18	3	56	67	50	4.9
39 BU7	3	26	5	42	80	70	8.8
40 BU8	3	24	4	53	90	80	5.2
41 BU9	2	18	4	56	50	0	8.4
42 FTT	2	28	6	39	0	na	na
43 EB1	3	22	2	55	100	na	6.9
44 PR1	3	27	1	50	100	na	na
45 PR2	3	25	1	46	100	na	na
46 PR3	3	26	1	52	100	na	na
47 PR4	2	27	1	44	100	na	na

Source: own depiction.

As the substantive articles of this special issue demonstrate, the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset provides systematic and comprehensive data for testing and developing theories of EU decision-making. It is more complete than existing research¹⁴ and, uniquely, provides data on member states that joined the EU and Eurozone after 2004. Our dataset follows, by and large, the DEU approach (Thomson et al. 2012), but is more focused on a single set of policy decisions related to fiscal and economic integration. The ‘EMU Positions’ dataset is based on a transparent and disciplined method of data collection, and the reported position scores refer to clearly defined points in the policy space, where higher scores indicates more pro-integrative proposals. Importantly, the interested user can trace them to their underlying sources. The online appendix provides access to data and further information on our coding.

¹⁴ For instance, Armingeon and Cranmer (2018) coded positions on 5 contested issues, and they had to drop three EU countries from their analysis because of insufficient data.

References

- Achen, C. H. (2006). Institutional realism and bargaining models. In R. Thomson, F. N. Stokman, C. H. Achen, & T. König (Eds.), *The European Union Decides* (pp. 86-123). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Armingeon, K., & Cranmer, S. (2018). Position-taking in the Euro crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(4), 546-566. doi:10.1080/13501763.2016.1268642
- Arregui, J., & Thomson, R. (2009). States' bargaining success in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(5), 655-676.
- Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two Faces of Power. *The American Political Science Review*, 56(4), 947-952.
- Bailer, S. (2011). Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers. *Negotiation Journal*, 27(4), 447-475.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). *Party Politics in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Benoit, K., Laver, M., Arnold, C., Pennings, P., & Hosli, M. O. (2005). Measuring National Delegate Positions at the Convention on the Future of Europe Using Computerized Word Scoring. *European Union Politics*, 6(3), 291-313. doi:10.1177/1465116505054834
- Blauberger, M., Puntscher Riekman, S., & Wydra, D. (2014). Introduction: Rationale of the Symposium. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(OnlineFirst), 1-3.
- Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., & Tanenbaum, E. (Eds.). (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2004). Decision-Making Models, Rigor and New Puzzles. *European Union Politics*, 5(1), 125-138. doi:10.1177/1465116504040448
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Stokman, F. N. (Eds.). (1994). *European Community Decision-Making. Models, Applications, and Comparisons*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Caporaso, J. A., & Rhodes, M. (Eds.). (2016). *Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Copelovitch, M., Frieden, J. A., & Walter, S. (2016). The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), 811-840.
- Costello, R., & Thomson, R. (2013). The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7), 1025-1039. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.795393
- Cramme, O., & Hobolt, S. B. (Eds.). (2014). *Democratic Politics in a European Union Under Stress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cross, J. P. (2013). Everyone's a winner (almost): Bargainings success in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 14(1), 70-94.
- Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson, W. E. (Eds.). (2017). *The European Union in Crisis*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dyson, K. (2017). Playing for High Stakes: The Eurozone Crisis. In D. Dinan, N. Nugent, & W. E. Paterson (Eds.), *The European Union in Crisis* (pp. 54-76). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2011). Eurobonds – Concepts and Implications. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201103/20110316ATT15714/20110316ATT15714EN.pdf>

- Fabbrini, S. (2015). *Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frieden, J. A. (1991). Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization*, 45(4), 425-451.
- Frieden, J. A. (1999). Actors and Preferences in International Relations. In D. A. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (pp. 39-76). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Frieden, J. A., & Walter, S. (2017). Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20(1), 371-390.
- Golub, J. (2012). How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(9), 1294-1315. doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.693413
- Hall, P. A. (2012). The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis. *German Politics*, 21(4), 355-371.
- Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). *Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (2011). *The Political System of the EU. Third Edition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2007). *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(01), 1-23. doi:doi:10.1017/S0007123408000409
- Höpner, M., & Lutter, M. (2018). The diversity of wage regimes: why the Eurozone is too heterogeneous for the Euro. *European Political Science Review*, 10(1), 71-96.
- Howarth, D. J., & Quaglia, L. (2016). *The Political Economy of the Banking Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Humphreys, M., & Jacobs, A. M. (2015). Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Approach. *American Political Science Review*, 109(4), 653-673. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000453
- Ioannou, D., Leblond, P., & Niemann, A. (2015). European integration and the crisis: practice and theory. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2), 155-176.
- Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., & Macdonald, M. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klüver, H. (2013). *Lobbying in the European Union. Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- König, T., & Hug, S. (2006). Introduction. In T. König & S. Hug (Eds.), *Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution* (pp. 1-8). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Laffan, B. (2016). Europe's union in crisis: tested and contested. *West European Politics*, 39(5), 915-932.
- Lane, P. R. (2012). The European Sovereign Debt Crisis. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(3), 49-68.
- Leuffen, D., Malang, T., & Wörle, S. M. (2014). Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(3), 616-631.
- Leuffen, D., Shikano, S., & Walter, S. (2013). Measurement and Data Aggregation in Small-n Social Scientific Research. *European Political Science*, 12(1), 40-51.
- Lupia, A., & Elman, C. (2014). Openness in Political Science: Data Access and Research

- Transparency: Introduction. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 47(1), 19-42.
- Majone, G. (2014). *Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis. Has Integration Gone Too Far?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manners, I., & Whitman, R. G. (2016). Another Theory is Possible: Dissident Voices in Theorising Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(1), 3-18.
- Marks, G. (2007). Introduction: Triangulation and the square-root law. *Electoral Studies*, 26(1), 1-10.
- Mattila, M. (2004). Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(1), 29-50.
- Mattila, M. (2009). Roll call analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers after the 2004 enlargement. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(6), 840-857.
- Mattila, M. (2012). Resolving controversies with DEU data. *European Union Politics*, 13(3), 451-461. doi:10.1177/1465116512441507
- Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(4), 473-524.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Moravcsik, A., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), *European Integration Theory. Second Edition* (pp. 67-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Morrow, J. D. (1999). The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In D. A. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (pp. 77-114). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Poole, K. T. (2005). *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Princen, S. (2012). The DEU Approach to EU Decision-Making: A Critical Assessment. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(4), 623-634. doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.662039
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
- Rodrik, D. (1998). Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5), 997-1032.
- Samuelson, P. A. (1948). Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference. *Economica*, 15(60), 243-253. doi:10.2307/2549561
- Scharpf, F. W. (1997). *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schelkle, W. (2017). *The political economy of monetary solidarity: understanding the euro experiment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). European Integration and the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 321-337.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2), 177-195.
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Moravcsik, A. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), *European Integration Theory* (pp. 67-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneider, G., Finke, D., & Bailer, S. (2010). Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. *Political Studies*, 58(1), 85-103.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

- Selck, T. J. (2004). On the Dimensionality of European Union Legislative Decision-Making. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 16(2), 203-222. doi:10.1177/0951629804041119
- Sinn, H.-W. (2014). *The Euro Trap. On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets and Beliefs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stokman, F. N., & Thomson, R. (2004). Winners and losers in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 5(1), 5-23.
- Thomson, R. (2009). Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargement. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(6), 756-781.
- Thomson, R. (2011). *Resolving Controversy in the European Union. Legislative Decision-Making before and after Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomson, R., Arregui, J., Leuffen, D., Costello, R., Cross, J., Hertz, R., & Jensen, T. (2012). A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII). *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(4), 604-622. doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.662028
- Thomson, R., Boerefijn, J., & Stokman, F. N. (2004). Actor alignments in European Union decision making. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(2), 237-261.
- Thomson, R., & Hosli, M. (2006). Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decisionmaking. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(2), 391-417.
- Thomson, R., & Stokman, F. N. (2006). Research design: measuring actors' positions, saliences and capabilities. In R. Thomson, F. N. Stokman, C. A. Achen, & T. König (Eds.), *The European Union Decides. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions* (pp. 25-53). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomson, R., Stokman, F. N., Achen, C. A., & König, T. (Eds.). (2006). *The European Union Decides. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thurner, P. W., Pappi, F. U., & Stoiber, M. (2002). *EU intergovernmental conferences. A quantitative analytical reconstruction and data-handbook of domestic preference formation, transnational networks and dynamics of compromise during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung.
- Tosun, J., Wetzel, A., & Zapryanova, G. (2014). The EU in Crisis: Advancing the Debate. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 195-211. doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.886401
- Tsebelis, G., & Hahn, H. (2014). Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(10), 1388-1411. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.929167
- Veen, T. (2011). Positions and salience in European Union politics: Estimation and validation of a new dataset. *European Union Politics*, 12(2), 267-288. doi:10.1177/1465116510394381
- Warntjen, A. (2012). Measuring salience in EU legislative politics. *European Union Politics*, 13(1), 168-182. doi:10.1177/1465116511428495
- Wasserfallen, Fabio (2014). Political and Economic Integration in the EU: The Case of Failed Tax Harmonization. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(2):420-435.
- Zimmer, C., Schneider, G., & Dobbins, M. (2005). The contested Council: Conflict dimensions of an intergovernmental EU institution. *Political Studies*, 53(2), 403-422.

EMU --- CHOICES



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 649532

www.EMUchoices.eu