Consensus prevails that the EMU requires reforms. Instead of stretching, watering down, mutating or even circumventing the existing Treaty limits when pursuing further reforms Elisabeth Lentsch and Stefan Griller recommend to not only adjust the underlying constitutional EMU framework substantively, but address also the rigidity of the EU Treaties as such by de-constitutionalising EMU law.
While the economic woes of the crisis were certainly unevenly distributed, the legislative bargaining on EMU reforms left no states as unequivocal winners or losers. Contrary to general perceptions Germany did not dominate the decision-making.
France and Germany control the agenda and broker compromises, but they do not dictate Eurozone reforms
France and Germany control the EU agenda and broker viable compromises. Yet, they do not dictate outcomes.
One dimensional conflict structure with two opposing coalitions - North and South - makes agreements on EMU reforms difficult. Yet, it also puts France and Germany in a position to formulate compromises.
Italy - somewhat surprisingly - supported EMU reforms imposing fiscal discipline. It was not motivated by a traditional policy of self-imposing external constraints - vincolo esterno, but rather by an effort to avoid a formal bailout at all costs.