Although domestic factors play a crucial role in international and European Union negotiations, there are no consistent explanations regarding how ideologically distinct governments differ in their reactions to the Eurocrisis at the international and domestic level. Are elected governments tied to their voters when conducting negotiations and initiating unpopular reforms at the domestic level? Do they differ from technocratic governments, that can behave more freely than elected governments preceding or following them in office? To answer this question, the chapter considers the negotiation behaviour of partisan and technocratic governments during European Union reform negotiations in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary as well as in Italy and Greece. Our results point to little difference in behaviour, which can be interpreted as a sign of increasing technocracy across the board in European affairs. Moreover, we study whether technocratic governments were responsible for implementing unpopular reforms not favoured by the majority of the population. Empirically, we rely on a new dataset, EMU Formation, from the EU2020 EMU Choices project including 47 negotiated issues between 2010 and 2015 coded from document analysis and expert interviews. The chapter also uses technical reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit to further disentangle the negotiation behaviour of technocratic governments compared to democratically elected ones. We find that government changes do not detectable changes in negotiation behaviour and that the technocratic governments during the Eurocrisis did not act as representatives of the people by negotiating in a rather pro-European way internationally and by implementing unpopular reforms domestically.