Following the discussions and the mid-term conference in Rome and the feedback received there, we are releasing the first 2 working papers:

 

Morlino, L. and Sottilotta, C. (2017). Circumventing constraints by internalizing Troika oversight? Italy and the Euro crisis negotiations. EMU Choices Working Paper 2017.

 

Abstract:

With the notable exception of Malta, South European countries were severely hit by the Euro crisis. In the extant literature, Southern Europe is often presented as a relatively homogeneous group of debt-ridden countries with converging preferences on the terms of future integration steps. Nonetheless, at a closer look, the ways in which South European countries adjusted to external constraints during the 2010-2013 negotiations diverged substantially. Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and (although in an attenuated form) Spain were all subject to direct oversight by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF (the so-called ‘Troika’), while Italy, in spite of its gargantuan public debt, managed to avoid that. Starting from a discussion of the negotiated responses to the Euro crisis and of South European countries’ stances vis-àvis a number of contested issues emerged during the negotiations, this paper engages with LI theory to suggest that at the height of the Euro crisis Italy managed to avoid external Troika oversight by internalizing it.

 

Saurugger, S. and Fontan, C. (2017). Courts as political actors: resistance to the EU’s new economic governance mechanisms at the domestic level. EMU Choices Working Paper 2017.

 

Abstract:

Courts are increasingly considered to be political actors in liberal democracies as they deal with fundamental disagreements within a given polity. Because of its political salience and the extent of its consequences, the crisis of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has exposed such fundamental disagreements between and within its member-states, which numerous plaintiffs have brought before domestic courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

The aim of this paper is to analyze this judicialization of the EMU crisis. Using a database on lawsuits introduced in all 28 member states with regard to crisis measures and the new EMU governance mechanisms introduced since 2010, we study which actors use the courts and under which circumstances. This article is embedded in the politics of law literature, developed in EU studies since the 1980s. Based on this literature we developed five central hypotheses on actors and legal timing in order to understand the process and the reasons for the judicialization of the EMU crisis.